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Abstract

eighteen veterans, ten discussed the killing of the four
civilians in their accounts. This article focuses on the
relationship between the interviewees and me as the
interviewer. For concise and easy management, this
article will explore one particular incident that occurred
of which the narrators spoke.

This paper explores the issues of the participant
interviewer in a military history context. Participant
interviewers may have a stake in the results of their
work, as they are part of the story that is under
investigation and can influence the result to fit their
prejudices. This paper focuses on the strong desire that
the interviewees have to correct errors in the official
record. As Alessandro Portelli says, ‘oral history is not
just a collection of stories, but also their interpretation
and representation.’1 A narrative recorded by a
participant may produce a realistic interpretation of
battlefield events rather than the official, battalion, or a
popular military history of those times. This article is
based on oral histories of national servicemen, regular
soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers, and
gives an exposure of the issues involved in a participant
interviewer taking oral histories.

Methodology
The main methodology used was the narrative
interview. A questionnaire was designed based on
one in an annex to Gary McKay’s Fragments of
Vietnam - four pages of questions divided into specific
sections.3 It was an extensive set of questions divided
into sub-sections with specific queries, starting with
entry and induction into the Army, and ending with
their discharge. Questions were aimed at eliciting
information on service life following the veteran’s
path from their initial training through to their final
training as part of a battle-ready battalion, and then
their deployment with that battalion into Vietnam. The
veterans’ opinions on their service and their return to
Australia were sought.

Introduction
I served as platoon commander of 2 Platoon, Alpha
Company, Second Battalion, Royal Australian
Regiment (2RAR) in Vietnam during 1967, with a
group of thirty-three men under my command. My
platoon was one of the uncelebrated sub-units of the
Australian Army’s deployment in the Vietnam War.
Unfortunately however, it came to prominence as the
result of an incident causing the deaths of Vietnamese
civilians. This incident has been discussed a number of
times in newspaper articles and military history books.2
These accounts, often based on scanty information,
quickly acquired the status of history.

These veterans’ narratives could then be compared
with archival records to situate and verify details.
The main archival record was the commander’s diary,
which is available on the internet in digital form. Some
documents, like the description of a soldier’s wound,
needed an off-line search in the National Archives
Collection, mainly at the Australian War Memorial
(AWM) Canberra.
The method moved to an ethnographic one where the
narratives and the documentary evidence were then
tested against the societal, cultural and ritual norms
of the veteran world. As trauma was involved, some
research also required consultations with psychological
papers and experts. Further reading was conducted on
the assumption that post-traumatic distress disorder
has a spiritual dimension.

My desire to offer an alternative account, based on
the experiences of eyewitnesses, was the genesis of
my recording the oral histories of my platoon and
the reason for assembling their views of the facts as
the participants believed they occurred. Eighteen
of the thirty-three soldiers in the platoon consented
to provide oral histories of their experiences during
the war. Each oral history interview was conducted
using a questionnaire covering their service from their
initial contact with the Army until discharge. Of these

My process was to record the veterans’ narratives using
the questionnaire. One other member spoke to me by
telephone, but an oral history was not recorded. Two
participants were killed in action during November
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1967. Three others have died since their return from
Vietnam, one of whom took part in this research.
The ‘chronological method’ as outlined in Alistair
Thomson’s book ANZAC Memories was used as a guide
to conduct the interviews.4 I began with the openended question: ‘Where did you join the Army?’ Some
participants needed no further encouragement to start
their army narrative. If the narrator stalled, I was able
to offer a further question that returned them to their
account. On occasions I moved from the chronological
method to the popular memory approach to ascertain
further details. The popular memory approach is
discussed in ANZAC Memories and frames questions
in accordance with my recollection of events.5 This
process focuses on a particular event and explores that
incident. This brought further information forward that
may have been missed in following the chronological
format. Most of the veterans were initially reluctant
to talk about the accidental killing of Vietnamese
civilians, which has become known as the ‘Bamboo
Pickers Incident,’ showing that it was a part of their
battlefield experience they wished to forget. Most did
not speak of this matter until the mode of questioning
was changed from chronological to popular.

they knew nothing. As the interviews proceeded, these
men tended to become more engaged and forthcoming
as though we had returned to the platoon of 1967, and
they were having an informal chat with ‘the boss.’
Their recall was far more extensive than they thought
possible. I continued the interview until the narrator
claimed that he had nothing more to say. I was often
more exhausted than the narrator.6
Oral histories can provide a primary source of
information about events, conditions and operations
by soldiers on the battlefield. As Hagopian comments;
… the value of the oral histories does not lie in
their providing unmediated truths. ... Even when
they remain true to events, veterans’ stories may
adjust to societal expectations - or what veterans
believe their audience wishes to hear. The stories
may also respond to the other narratives that
circulate around the storyteller … 7

The Incident
On 20th October 1967, fifteen members of the platoon
and I commenced a patrol of the four thousand metre
wide exclusion zone surrounding the Australian Task
Force base area at Nui Dat, Vietnam.8 This exclusion
area was designed to prevent the enemy coming close
enough to the base to launch an attack on the Australian
position.9 The exterior perimeter, called Line Alpha,
was situated on the edge of Vietnamese effective
mortar range, to prevent the enemy from providing
fire support in an attack on the Australian base.10 Line
Alpha did not follow any geographical feature or
fence, and was not marked. It was only a line on a
map.11 Between Line Alpha and the base perimeter
fence was a ‘free fire’ zone, which meant that anyone
or thing that moved within this area was a target.12 The
local Vietnamese were banned from this area and this
was communicated to them by various means.13 The
soldiers had retrieved leaflets that were airdropped in
the ‘free fire’ area warning the locals that they were
in a prohibited area. Task Force headquarters advised
that the relevant Vietnamese authorities had briefed
the locals. Available information suggested that no
friendly people would be inside Line Alpha. Constant
patrolling prevented enemy penetration.14

To Accept or Not To Accept?
All interviews except two were conducted in the
interviewees’ homes, which gave the veteran a relaxed
and familiar location in which to recall their memories.
When a narrator invited me to stay at his home I
accepted, as this placed the narrator in the role of the
host, and I became the guest. This helped to change the
power dynamics, as I then had to fit into the narrator’s
routine, rather than the other way around, with the
narrator controlling the environment. This meant that
our recording sessions were subjected to the domestic
routine of the household, such as meal timings. The
breaks to accommodate the domestic events resulted
in round table discussions with the wife or partner,
which added some interesting details. On one
occasion, the wife declared that she had heard more
in forty-eight hours about another ambush, than she
had in the previous forty years. The different ambush
was central to that narrator’s war chronicle. She
also claimed that the narrator had not fully informed
his psychiatrist of certain facts. Some expeditious
computer research resulted in the veteran taking
additional information to his next consultation, and as
a result, gained an increase in his pension. Frequently
there was a comment on the next day that the veteran
had had his best night’s sleep since leaving Vietnam.
At one breakfast the partner declared the same
information with great clarity.

On the evening of 22nd October 1967, this patrol laid
an ambush about one thousand metres inside Line
Alpha.15 Early the following morning, a group of
civilians entered the ambush area. One person in this
group took a long object off his shoulder and waved it
at the soldiers.16 The machine gunner opened fire, as
he believed it was a weapon.

The interviews took far longer than veterans anticipated,
mainly because they took the view at the outset that
they had nothing of interest to say. This may reflect the
supposition that as an officer, I knew everything, while

The firing lasted less than 30 seconds, and in that
time the platoon’s machine guns and rifles had killed
four civilians and badly wounded a fifth who later
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On the platoon’s return to the Nui Dat Base, the Company
Commander suggested to me that the platoon should
have been carrying captured enemy weapons to place on
dead bodies.19 This would allow the battalion to claim
these dead as enemy. The Australians had adopted the
American system of rating an operation’s success on the
body count. It seemed that the Company Commander
wanted the company’s statistics enhanced.
In my opinion, this was deceitful and undoubtedly illegal.
I was prepared to account for this incident and record the
details correctly. During our discussion, the Company
Commander instructed me as to how I was to write my
report. This conversation was conducted out of hearing
range of any other person. My report was written with
a reference to the conversation about enemy weapons,
but I was later ordered to sign a report that had my
observations about these directions deleted. As I was
uneasy with these instructions, I kept a personal copy
of the ‘after action report’ in case I was ever accused of
breaching the Geneva conventions. 20 This patrol report
with the company commander’s preferred wording is
below. The lines of the paste-over are evident in the
reproduction.

died. There were another six wounded. 17 The order
to cease-fire was given when it became clear that the
platoon had fired on unarmed persons, including women
and children. The platoon returned to base.18 Later we
learned that the villagers had been looking for bamboo
thus the incident became known as the ‘Bamboo Pickers’
ambush.

The narratives I recorded during my research are all
influenced by the ANZAC legend. A number of the
narrators recall that their instructors during their initial
training constantly repeated that they were part of the
great ANZAC story.21
This theme of the ANZAC
permeates their narratives.
As Portelli highlights, our interviewees come to an
interview with an agenda of their own. 22 My narrators
wanted to position themselves within the ANZAC
legend. Some related their family members’ service
in previous wars with their Vietnam experience, while
others made connections with the grand ANZAC
tradition of volunteering to serve their country in distant
lands, motivated by a sense of patriotism.23 This reflects
the fact that the ANZAC legend and the digger tradition
remains a popular way for a veteran to recall their
service. Lex McAulay, Gary McKay and other authors
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have suggested that the Vietnam veteran was a member
of the ANZAC story.24

Sunday 8th August the Sydney papers attacked Cairns
for his naiveté and left-wing views, while the Brisbane
Sun had a front page headline ‘The Atrocity is on
File.’33

What Did He Say?

On that same morning I was contacted by Army Office
and asked to report on the following day, to the Director
General of Operational Plans.34 On the Monday, only
a week after Cairns had made his allegations, I was
searching the commanders’ diaries with the Army
Historian, Major Ian McNeil.35 At the same time, the
ABC program, This Day Tonight, was arranging for
two of my soldiers to appear on their program in which
they confirmed that civilians had been killed in the 23rd
October 1967 ambush by Australian troops. Their facts
did not match Cairns’ numbers or dates; however it was
an attempt by them to set the record straight.36 Prior to
appearing on the program, one veteran rang the army
asking for support but this was denied because he was
now a civilian. There was considerable time separating
the two different ambush events; one occurred on 23rd
October 1967, and the second on the night of 11th/12th
August 1970.

The transcribers of the veterans’ recordings experienced
problems understanding the veterans’ language. These
difficulties usually occurred when interviewees
came to an emotionally traumatic event. Two things
occurred simultaneously, firstly the narrator lowered
his voice, and secondly he lapsed into a vernacular
of the mid-1960s, which was a mixture of Australian
Army jargon, Army argot, the language of Americans
serving in Vietnam, and Armed Forces Radio Saigon
speak.25 The battlefield moments that made the greatest
impression had to be spoken in the idiom of their war. I
was an insider, therefore I knew what they were saying,
but an outsider like the transcribers did not. I believe
that it was an effort by the veterans to keep the secrets
in the ‘family,’ but also allowed them to discuss their
service so the record could be set straight.26 This to
the outsider may sound confusing but in the veteran
world represents a path to achieve conflicting goals.
Conflicting purposes were often the norm on the
battlefield.

At last, Minister Killen’s requirement for an
investigation had been fulfilled – namely, the identities
of two ABC informants and their unit were declared.37
However, a full enquiry failed to eventuate, and it was
never clear whether any of the ABC informants (all
four) were talking of the same incident referred to by
Cairns, who was being castigated for his opposition
to the war and political views. It appeared that the
Defence Force’s rebuttal of Dr Cairns’ allegation was
far more important than the facts about civilian deaths,
which were not addressed. The simple fact that the
protagonists were talking about several different events
was lost in the debate.

In August 1976, Dr Jim Cairns, a member of the
Labor Party and principal organiser of the Vietnam
Moratorium movement in Australia, alleged in a
Melbourne newspaper that Australian troops in
Vietnam had killed twenty-seven civilians and most
probably declared them as enemy rather than civilian
deaths.27 This caused a political furore and bought out
the conflicting ideological positions of the proponents
of a debate between the politicians, media and veterans.
The Minister for Defence at that time, the Hon. James
Killen, a member of the Coalition Government which
had committed troops to Vietnam, claimed that the
allegations were defamatory of the nation and attacked
the good name of the Australian Army.28 He related
the Vietnam veteran to the ANZAC Legend. Killen’s
position was that Australian troops would never commit
such an ‘atrocity’ and promised a full scale inquiry.29

Over the years, there have been suggestions at Vietnam
Veterans’ reunions and other gatherings that soldiers’
histories have not been recorded correctly. While the
veterans I interviewed were among those who made
that complaint, it emerged during the interviews that
few, if any, had read the official history, much less
checked the commander’s diary that is accessible
through the Australian War Memorial website.38 The
unease that these soldiers have about the accurate
recording of history, seems to have been formed from
listening to other veterans speak, reading ‘populist
histories’, listening to ANZAC Day orations or being
informed by the media.

The word ‘atrocity’ had been used by the media and the
Minister, but not by Dr. Cairns.30 His allegation was
simply that he had been told that Australian soldiers had
massacred civilians. He had no proof to as to whether
the dead were civilians or the enemy. These newspaper
articles support Gary Kulik’s contention that in stories
about war, most military history and discussions of
events on the battlefield, tend to confirm the speaker’s
ideology, political and social pre-conceptions.31

Setting The Record Straight
Forty years after Vietnam, I decided to attempt to
change this situation. I enrolled at the University of
Wollongong to study the history of the Vietnam War
and veterans’ oral histories and set the record straight.39
While the narrators remembered there was media

Following the initial furore, there were claims and
counter claims throughout the week until the Minister
stated that he had not been given any specific details
about civilians being killed so he was not prepared
to convene an inquiry into Cairns’ allegations.32 On
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coverage of the ambush, none were able to give any
accurate dates, as though it was all too painful. None
of the narrators were able to place the media interest
accurately, and one participant said that this furore
occurred two years after our time in Vietnam:
... two years after there was an article in a
Sydney paper, Sydney Telegraph, ‘Australia’s
My Lai’, and it was about that action. Two
people that I know of for sure, Participant S
and Non-Participant C, were contacted by the
Sydney press about that story and both of them
told the reporters to go and get rooted, that there
was nothing in it.40
The non-participant spoke unprompted about the
incident and like the rest could not remember the
specific details like the date. He claimed the ABC
approached him after Cairns had identified him. This
puzzled me as Battalion Headquarters in Vietnam
only received consolidated company lists and would
not be able to determine an individual’s platoon.
His identification by the media should be attributed
to someone who knew who were members of the
platoon but did not know that this veteran was absent
on the day in question. The non-participant made the
following comment:

The Age, 2 August 1976.

The relationship between the interviewer and narrator
in this research is different from normal oral histories,
in that the interviewer had an earlier relationship and
they were participants in the events recalled. This
relationship was partly defined by military law, and
partly was built by working together in hard, harsh
and difficult conditions, against a number of common
obstacles including an enemy who was intent on
killing us. This group welded together as a combat
unit which shared a common military language, lore
and tradition. We were of comparable age, similar
cultural backgrounds, and had a deep knowledge of
the events being discussed in the interviews. All were
indoctrinated with the same warrior tradition and
sense of belonging to the group. There were some
differences; for example the platoon was divided
into Catholics and Protestants, which was still an
important distinction in the 1960s.

… when I came back to Australia I was
pursued [by] a fellow because he found out
from a politician who found out that I was in 2
platoon. He pursued me for quite a long time
trying to get, he had journalists from current
affair programs on television and I can’t recall
the title of the program on this particular day
when they were really pressing me, and they
said they’d have a helicopter, a journalist up
there on a chopper from Sydney, … and it
would be on television that night. Anyway I
refused again to say anything. Number one, I
wasn’t there and I’d already told them I wasn’t
there. And secondly I didn’t want to talk about
it. It’s not … right to talk about those sorts of
things in my opinion because who’s going
to prove what those people were anyway…
Anyway, they eventually got a fellow and I
can’t recall who it was, up further north, up the
coast in Townsville or Ayr or somewhere up
there to talk to them on TV, and I actually saw
him being interviewed but I can’t recall what
happened.41

The situation was somewhat different to the existing
literature on insider oral history collection due to the
similarities between narrators and interviewer rather
than the differences. This introduces a different
focus and some new factors into oral history theory.
There are a number of insider-outsider articles in
the oral history literature but they tend to be based
on gender, tribal taboo or generational parameters.
While there were some similarities with these
situations, it was different. It was all male, same
age and similar background scenario.43

While lacking details about the incident, he gives
the background to the time and cultural detail,
which is one of oral history’s features. With another
interviewer, it is possible that he may not have raised
the issue of the ambush at all, as he said:

There was no formal debriefing of the patrol as
depicted in Fred Allison’s ‘Remembering a Vietnam
Firefight.’44 Allison’s methodology was to compare
a patrol debriefing with interviews taken many years
later. In this case there was no debriefing to consult.
There had been no discussion at the time nor did the
platoon openly discuss the event at reunions or other

… I thought very strongly about not talking
about those sorts of things to anybody.42
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role and a link with the interviewer.
These narratives crossed a number of boundaries
in sharing events, secrets and feelings. As Paul
Thompson comments, ‘the interviewer sits at the
feet of the narrators and learns from those who know
more about the subject’.46 Here, I was the former
officer now collaborating with my former soldiers to
produce a history.
In this research, I have moved from that position
of command and absolute authority, to a situation
of equality. I had to divest my authority and be
surprised and on occasions where it occurred, to resist
‘correcting’ the narrative if my recollection differed
from the narrator. I had to hear the interviewee,
and not force their testimony to confirm my own
recollections. I had to surrender my leadership role
and become an equal participant in the interview
with the narrator. This was not easy.
Prior to each recording, interviewees would ask
what I wanted them to say. It sounded like they
were seeking my instructions on how they were to
conduct their interview. While such questions may
be normal at the start of any oral history interview, in
this situation it seemed that I was still the authority
figure. Portelli suggests that some oral history
interviewees require a mandate from the interviewer
and will often try to tell the interviewer what they
think they want to hear.47 I would explain that I
wanted to record each individual’s experience as he
remembered it, nothing else. I made it clear that I
was investigating private memory and not the public
memory of the war. I clarified that I was conducting
research, not a witch-hunt, about past events. This
discussion gave them ‘permission to speak,’ and
even though there was some initial awkwardness,
all interviewees quickly became comfortable in
their role. Some interviewees offered to use their
diaries, notebooks and published works to help them
remember. I repeated that I was interested in their
unaided memory. Specific detail could be checked
later but initially it was their private memory that I
was pursuing.

The Advertiser, 3 August 1976.

gatherings. Generally snide comments were made
by those in the know who wished to obtain a reaction
from a platoon member generally by officers at
officer functions. This incident was in the corporate
memory but not fully documented.

Conduct Becoming an Officer

The preferred option was to say nothing if they
wanted something left off the record.
Silence
was the solution most took when an issue arose
that they preferred not to discuss. There seems to
be an unwritten list of subjects that should not be
spoken about that illustrates Thomson and Seal’s
observations about conflicting parts in the ANZAC
Legend.48 Some wished to only talk about that which
added to the national legend. This produced an issue
for the interviewer as to whether silences represent
a lack of knowledge or protection of their preferred
view of the war.

At the Royal Military College in officer training I
had been indoctrinated with the idea that officers do
not fraternise with soldiers. Normal convention was
that officers socialised and lived in different areas
from soldiers. Even in Vietnam, while the officers
lived with the troops when on operations, there was
delineation between officers and enlisted men in the
Nui Dat base.45 Each company had its own officers’
and sergeants’ mess, separating ranks for meals,
socialising and relaxing; but as a fighting group we
were one inseparable unit and interdependent on
each other. This interdependence was mentioned by
a number of narrators. It highlighted the narrator’s
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There was an acceptance of our shared experience
as veterans. This was the most important factor in
enabling a productive and respectful conversation
about our platoon’s role in the Vietnam War. Like
the veterans, I too had a personal agenda in wanting
to ‘set the record straight.’49 The events subsequent
to the Brisbane Sun exposé concerned me.50 Firstly,
the article written by a former national serviceman
portrayed the incident as an atrocity. Secondly the
Minister claimed that only ‘rogue soldiers’ killed
civilians and accidents identifying friend from foe
in his discussion did not exist.
How did my interviewees recall the ambush? Most
remembered their role with a remarkable degree
of clarity, confirming the literature that suggests
that traumatic events occupy a special place in
an individual’s memory.51
Portelli makes the
observation that public opinion and the media may
prefer fantasies, unreliable sources and myths to
the reality of the soldiers’ world.52 It produces a far
nicer picture of the war. On the other hand, when
soldiers interview soldiers, there is a temptation
to reconstruct a shared past that, consciously or
unconsciously, may portray events in a light that
flatters them and satisfies the expectation of their
audience.53 Truth may not only be a casualty of war,
but memories and some retelling of events may also
damage it.
My own memories about the incident are vivid.
The moment between the machine gun firing on the
civilians and hearing the whimpering of children
caught in the gunfire was very short but still remains
with all.

Brisbane Sunday Sun, 8 August 1976.

I knew instantly on hearing the cries for help that
something was very wrong. I ordered the platoon
to cease fire and ran towards the killing ground to
assess the carnage I realised had taken place. I was
confronted with a scene that will haunt me forever.
As I moved forward I was inwardly hoping that
the residual firing would kill me. It is testimony to
the training of the men that I was not hit. Was it
my learned skill to move among the weapons that
prevented me being another death that morning or
was it the skill of the soldiers who knew where I was
heading? I often wonder.

Past-Past
I was very familiar with the platoon’s actions since I
commanded its operations. My responsibilities meant
I moved around the platoon to make sure my plans
were being executed, and adjusted them if necessary.
My narrators could have assumed that I was a witness
to most of their actions on the battlefield and I knew all
the painful, unpleasant and ‘unsafe” moments. Thus
the narrator had an audience of one who knew the
‘essentials.’ While this was not always a certainty, it
was a given to the narrator.
At times, the interview entered what may be
called the past-past. We were actually back on the
battlefield with some narrators telling me exactly
where others and I were standing. We did not need
the lens of the present for both the narrator and
interviewer had been there and the lens of those
days was used. However, facts were essential and
necessary and this may explain why some wish to
resort to published works.

Do We Really Have To Talk
About This?
Only two narrators mentioned the ‘Bamboo Pickers’
of their own accord and one of them was not on the
ambush patrol. It is possible that a non-participant
interviewer may not have obtained details of this
incident, as most did not discuss the ambush without
a direct question. If the participant who volunteered
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As far I was concerned we all did the best we
could over there and if somebody got in the
road then bad luck, particularly if they shouldn’t
have been there. I don’t believe these people
should have been where they were.56
The participant who gave the longest commentary on
the incident spoke for twice as long as any other narrator.
He claimed that the platoon was tasked with the patrol
because it was a punishment for misbehaviour that had
attracted the wrath of a higher authority. These were
his comments:
Our section of the platoon got sprung with beer
in our lines and this happened all the time but
for some reason or other we got sprung because
they used to put them under floorboards.
Anyway our platoon had to provide a three-day
TAOR (Tactical Area of Responsibility) patrol,
which was highly unusual, because that was
usually provided by the D & E platoon (Defence
& Employment Platoon). For some reason there
was no one, I guess the rare circumstances
they didn’t do it they went to other platoons
and would say, ‘You’ve got to supply a TAOR
party.’ Anyway because someone had found
beer in our lines, which was a very regular
occurrence, they said, ‘Take half a platoon, get
out on this TAOR patrol.’ It turned out to be a
bit different with tragic consequences and I’m
not sure whether it was on the third morning or
the second morning.

Brisbane Sunday Sun, 8 August 1976.

information on the bamboo pickers was not interviewed
then a non-participant interviewee would not be
aware of the incident. This participant trusted me and
therefore spoke about the incident. I doubt that any of
the participants would have trusted a non-participant
with these memories, and would have remained silent
on this story thus leaving it hidden.

Interviewer: Okay do you want to talk about
what you remember of the Bamboo Pickers?

In the interviews I was asking my men to recall a
matter which had confused me and which, like them, I
had buried within me. This incident lasted less than a
minute but its legacy lasted for years. One participant
describes the ambush this way:

Interviewee: Because it was a three-day
TAOR patrol and having been on quite a few
operations I think we thought this was, ok we
are being punished, but it was a safe country. I
remember TAOR patrols had been through ever
since the taskforce commanded it was a three
thousand yard or metre no-go zone I think,
free fire zone, so you really wouldn’t expect
to see anyone there. I know they had to keep
the patrols up but it was almost routine and if
they hadn’t have kept them up it might have had
more serious consequences. 57

Very quick; not very long. Shit, how do you
tell time in that. I would say it was all over in
a minute, two minutes. There was, I mean it
would have gone a lot longer if there had have
been some armed men there but I think once it
was really obvious there wasn’t anyone armed
there that the shooting stopped pretty quick.
Yeah that’s all that I can remember of that. I
remember waiting for them to be taken away
with the chopper, holding them up and ... I
remember that guy with a sickle.54

Other narrators make a similar comment. It is as though
the narrators needed an excuse. They believe that they
should not have been involved in this incident. They
were suggesting that they had no option about being
there.

The same participant makes the suggestion that the
ambush was a set up:
I don’t know what was behind that ambush; I
mean obviously we knew they were going to be
there, that was the way it struck me. So someone
had organised for us to brass them up.55

Examination of the Task Force Patrol Program however,
suggests that the patrol allocations were distributed
evenly between companies.58 The participant quoted
above was located at the rear of the ambush setting,
and so was not an eye-witness to the event, but spent
considerable time in recalling the incident and theorising

The non-participant mentioned earlier spoke in defence
of our actions:
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about the locals’ knowledge of the exclusion zone. He
offered to produce a copy of a pamphlet, which warns
the locals of their exclusion. He detailed the medical
evacuation process and finished with a fantasised
ending in which he incorrectly claimed the RAAF
disposed of the bodies at sea.59 This is in conflict with
the commander’s diary.60 The bodies were returned to
their village. The participant verbalises and adapts a
popular myth in Vietnamese, American and Australian
literature that Vietnamese were on occasions thrown out
of helicopters.61 He couldn’t recall where he sourced
this myth. He confirms Hagopian’s observation that
narrators often tell stories that circulate around them
in their chronicle.62 He was wounded in the following
month and he nearly died. It could be that this near
death experience focused his attention on events that
occurred just prior to his wounding.

Conflicting Points Of View
The non-participant may have been trying to change
my point of view on events. This narrator and I had
previously had a number of discussions, which had
diverged along paths of opposing philosophies. One
ANZAC Day, our discussion had reached a point that
another platoon member had to separate us to prevent a
physical altercation. I had wondered in my preparation
for this research if this history between us would
influence the final outcome of the interview. Portelli in
his work observes that sometimes persons of opposing
points of view may produce a good interview due to
the fact that both sides are trying to win the other over,
while reaching the satisfaction of having their view
recorded.63
The other narrator present at this ANZAC Day
occurrence initially refused to discuss the ambush at
all. However, after a discussion off tape, he gave the
following explanation:
I’d like to backtrack. There was a question that
Ben asked me earlier about the civvies ambush,
and I said to him at the time ‘I’m not going to
talk about it.’ The reason I didn’t want to talk
about it was it affected Ben badly, and I didn’t
want to offend him, so therefore I said to him
‘I’m not going to talk about it.’ I’ve thought
about it since, spoken to Ben about it, and I’ll
now speak about it because quite frankly I don’t
believe that we were in the wrong. We were
in the right when we opened that ambush up,
because we were 1000 metres away from the
nearest village; we had a dark to dawn curfew on
all civvies; anything that moved in that period
was enemy. When we opened the ambush up,
when we had our targets in the killing area, it
was just starting to break first light; and in that
situation, I have no problems at all. I justified
it to myself then, and I’ll do it again, now. We

Courier Mail, 10 August 1976.
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Interviewee: Yeah it did. Once one bullet fired
everyone went. All they needed was one bloke
to pull the trigger.66

were right in opening that ambush up. It was
unfortunate that civvies, both old and young
were caught up in it, but they were in the wrong
place at the wrong time. I’d just like to clear
that point, because I know it affected Ben. It
didn’t worry me at all, and it still doesn’t worry
me today on that same issue. But we’ll move
on from there.64

This participant’s testimony suggests that he had
seen what he believed to be a weapon, but had then
identified it as a stick, before the firing started. He did
not know what to do and was considering this aspect
when the ambush was sprung. Confusion seems to be
the one consistent feature of the narratives.

This was the total of his words on the incident except
for an emphatic ‘No’ earlier. He spoke about me in the
third person as though he was correcting the record.
He discloses it was an operational accident rather than
intentional killing of civilians. He had set the record
straight and he was not going to discuss it any further
and the interview moved on as he had requested.

One participant brings the confusion theme out while
suggesting that others were controlling the patrol:
… they were supposed to be in an unauthorised
zone or something. No, we were never told
anything; it was all covered up wasn’t it? I
think after that they decided it was time for us to
go back to camp; is that correct? They thought
that we’d had enough by then and we had.67

The majority of the platoon was censorious of the
machine gunner, who initiated the ambush. As a
participant said:

Another remembers:

To this day, from what I’ve heard from others
involved in that action it was totally unnecessary.
The bloke on the machine gun was told not to
fire by his Number 2, they were civilians, and
he just opened up and I think we know who that
person was ...

And we had to get up and fuck off and head
straight back to Nui Dat. Yeah; straight back.68
One participant is certain that he had killed two young
girls that day. Their wounds were consistent with the
ballistics of his weapon. I was amazed by the detail the
veteran was able to remember:

Later the same participant makes the comment:
Going back to the machine gunner (name given)
I do remember now being told later on that he
[the man with the stick] aimed and, it may have
been the machine gun second in command, that
he thought it was a rifle and you shoot first and
ask questions later …65

To this day I believe I was responsible for
killing two teenage girls. I was the only one
in the unit [sic] with an armalite and one of
the girls had a bullet in the head, just a little
black spot; if she had been hit with a 7.62 she
would have had a hole in the back of her head
and there was nothing. The other one was the
same situation, shot in the chest just above the
breast and there again just a little black hole and
the size of an adult Vietnamese from that range
a 7.62 would have taken half her back out, but
there was nothing, just those two little black
holes. I was the only one with an armalite, there
were no F1s, no 9 Mil weapons there that day;
the rest are one M60 or me with the armalite.69

The soldier who most likely fired the first shot died
before he could be interviewed. On this patrol the usual
machine gunner was absent and he volunteered to take
this position. His widow gave very specific details of
this incident, telling me that she had learnt about the
ambush by listening to her husband talking in his sleep.
She claimed that he had never discussed the matter
with her. Her knowledge was remarkably accurate and
detailed.

After the platoon had returned to base, one participant
threw his machine gun down in front of the platoon
sergeant and exclaimed, ‘I am a murderer.’70 The
sergeant addressed him by his first name and said,
‘Pick up that machine gun and come to my tent.’71
The participant did so and they had a discussion about
civilians killing a soldier. The sergeant stated that these
civilians were in a prohibited area and could have been
VC supporters. He then advised the soldier he would
take no action over the mishandling of his machine gun
if the soldier went and cleaned the weapon and relaxed
while pondering the sergeant´s advice.

Yet another participant, the number two on the machine
gun, said:
I can remember the fuckin’ stick and I thought
it was a rifle.
Well he was about from here to that post away
from me. I could see the stick and I just kept
quiet and looking around everybody and then
someone opened up and that was it. Because
they must have seen the same thing but I could
see it was a stick. So everyone just opened up ...
Interviewer: It looked like a rifle?

After return to Australia, another participant had this
experience during a visit to the local markets:
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in our time on the battlefield.75 This equality was
demonstrated by one exploring the Bamboo Pickers
incident taking as much time as he wished, while the
other was prepared to dismiss the incident as it took the
gloss off his ANZAC legend.

I remember one day down here at the markets
when I was going through a rough time, an
Asian woman in a blue shirt like that woman
had on came walking through the crowd and
you know I really believed it was her. I thought
she was going to come over and tell me off. I
thought, she’s gonna fuckin’ give me an earful
that woman, that’s how my head had gone
stupid.72

This later narrator preferred providing a positive
image of his Vietnam experience, like the majority of
my narrators. I was forced to ask questions to elicit
discussion of negative aspects of their war service.
The need to keep parts of his history hidden was made
evident; he had written a chapter in Bill Parry’s book
Just A Nasho.76 He wrote about his life as a national
serviceman and he cited two incidents, both of which
fitted ‘the Bean template’ for ANZAC military history.77
His refusal to discuss unpleasant aspects of our life on
the battlefield is supported by non-participant D, who
stated that this type of incident should not be discussed.
However, this person goes on to discuss the incident,
thus illustrating Portelli’s thesis that opposing parties
are trying to win the other party and the readers to their
point of view.

Discussion
While my research presents a less than glowing picture
of our battlefield experience, it is not my intention
to question the courage or bravery of our soldiers.
Some historians may challenge this research because
it ventures into the psychological realm. The details
embedded in these oral histories are the narrators’
realities, and in this case the facts tallied with the
commander’s diary and other official documents. At
the same time it must be accepted that oral histories are
not necessarily the absolute truth. Anyone dismissing
oral history because the narrators detail some mythical
explanations may be discarding some good primary
source material.

Alistair Thomson’s hypothesis that veterans tend to
craft a history they can live with became clear to me
when presented with peer review comments about this
article. Most comments touched the points that I was
keeping hidden in my own narrative. The reviewers
were not pointing to my lack of disclosure, but rather
raising points to improve the article. However, when I
reflected on the comments there were areas that needed
to be discussed that I was hoping to leave undiscovered.
These comments have resulted in additions and better
explanations in this article. Some material would not
have been included if the article had it not been peerreviewed.

The keynote speaker at the 2014 Barcelona
International Oral History Conference73 stated that
people who have a hidden history which is brought into
the public record are living in heaven, for their hidden
history had been recognised. This research suggests
that a hidden history which continues to be denied puts
the participants of that history into a living hell, as their
life is not recognised, especially if that denial comes
from official sources.

Early childhood taboos clash with Army training
to kill, and this causes conflicts in remembering,
especially when it involves the killing of women and
children. This dilemma is minimised by embracing the
national legend; however this is not a lasting solution
to alleviating pain.

One member of the ambush patrol refused to take part
in this research for he did not want the story of the
Bamboo Pickers or another incident not explored in
this article to be known in his hometown. He lives
in fear of his history in the war being exposed, and
shown to be different from the sanitised version of
the Vietnam ANZAC legend. He lives this legend in
various clubs, but lives in fear of exposure.

Amongst the platoon, there was acknowledgment of
the effect of the ambush on me, and I was aware that
this could introduce a bias into this research. Where
the narrators were attuned to my sense of guilt, they did
adjust their narratives to fit what they thought I needed
to hear, being careful not to offend me. The participant,
who initially refused to say anything about the ambush,
changed his mind after I stated that I would not be
upset by discussion about the incident. He was not
alone in acknowledging my psychological state after
the incident, and another soldier claimed I had become
a changed person after the incident. There seemed to
be a concession that most of my soldiers knew I was
distressed by the incident, and as a result they were
prepared to comment when I questioned them on it. I
was an impediment to full discussion, it seemed.

The longest and the shortest speakers about this incident
had made contact with me some time before the
Welcome March in 1983.74 They had formed working
relationships with me. One was where cooperation
between two government departments was the basis
for our friendship renewal, and the other was comembership on a committee of a branch of the Royal
Australian Regiment. This later narrator arranged
for my appointment as our battalion representative.
Both relationships were on an equal basis, rather than
one being in a position of authority as was the case
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Many of the narrators who took part in the ambush
were angry. A number stated that the system failed
to support them and their mates during the public
disclosures on civilian deaths. In this case, these oral
history narratives may correct the speculation and
ill-founded assertions of both the politicians and the
media reports of August 1976.
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